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ABSTRAcT
This article represents an encounter between Antje Du Bois-Pedain’s recent 
Transitional Amnesty in South Africa and Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever. I 
argue that Du Bois-Pedain’s work is magisterial in the sense that relates it to 
the meaning of the archive identified in Derrida’s text. Taking the Derridean 
argument a step further I aim to illustrate that this text-as-archive reveals a 
glimpse of its own death drive — it is conscious of its unconscious. I argue 
that the death drive of the archive is here ultimately resisted/countered pre-
cisely by Du Bois-Pedain’s willingness to confront the outside of the archive 
that is this work.
Preface
A book makes its way onto a desk and strikes up a conversation with 
one that has been there for a while. In this case, the books that spoke 
to each other did so, literally, from cover to cover, simply because 
the covers of both these books arrestingly represent a fire. (In what 
follows I hope the reader will see that the figuration of fire — force of 
destruction, of burning — is crucial — everything but coincidental — 
here.) The one book bears a fiery orange cover with a burning flame 
in the centre.1 The other, the one that is the subject of this review, also 
depicts flames. It shows detail from a painting by Kim Berman entitled 
Through the Wire: Lowveld Fire I.2 In a sense, both these books are 
burning, not least because of the burning issues they address. One af-
ternoon, while a fire was raging through the mountains of Cape Town, 
* BCom (Law) (cum laude) LLB (summa cum laude) LLD (UP), Senior lecturer, Univer-
sity of Cape Town.
1 J Derrida Archive Fever (1995).
2 A Du Bois-Pedain Transitional Amnesty in South Africa (2008).
REVIEW ARTIcLE
419
       
I was fortunate enough to overhear a conversation between these two 
books. What follows is an account of what I heard.
Epigraph
‘The ethical limit of this vision is that it displays the limit of the “truth 
and reconciliation” idea: what if we have a perpetrator for whom the 
public confession of his crimes not only does not give rise to any ethical 
catharsis in him, but even generates an additional obscene pleasure?’3
Introduction
It is by now common cause that the availability of amnesty for politi-
cally motivated crimes committed during the apartheid-era was a non-
negotiable condition for the very possibility of a reconstituted South 
Africa. Consequently, the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
(TRC) became the home of South Africa’s apartheid-related amnesty 
process. The naming of this commission coupled with its designation 
as the body empowered to grant amnesty, of course revealed particular 
ideological commitments and established deliberate — but not neces-
sary — connections between Truth, Reconciliation and Amnesty — the 
Three Musketeers of the South African transition. When critics of the 
TRC point to the ‘failures’ of the TRC, we often tend to neglect precisely 
this fact about the TRC: that it was a political instrument — a creation 
of a political will convinced that the way in which favourable circum-
stances for a successful transition is created is through encouraging 
(enjoining?) reconciliation amongst the members of the newly consti-
tuted body politic. A particular mode of reconciliation was envisaged: 
one that claimed to be linked to truth and that fore-grounded amnesty 
(and consequently implicated the entire genealogy and economics 
of the concept of pardon — apology, forgiveness etc — in politics) 
in exchange for such truth (and, by implication, reconciliation). The 
fertile ground for a successful reconciliation was, it was said, created 
when violators/perpetrators tell the truth (but as we shall see, only a 
particular kind of truth) about their horrific deeds (but only particular 
kinds of deeds, as we shall also see) and, in exchange for the truth (and 
nothing but the ‘truth’), are legally exonerated from their crimes.
Quite simply, the price for the truth, according to those who took 
responsibility for South Africa’s reconciliation model, is no price (at 
least not in the positivistic ‘legal’ or ‘economic’ sense of that word). The 
legal name of such a no-price is amnesty. And, as Antje Du Bois-Pedain 
3 S Žižek How To Read Lacan (2006) 97.
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indicates in a magisterial new work,4 this amnesty — this payment of 
no legal price — is transitional. It is what negotiated the transition; 
it is the price for the new South Africa. Is it possible to ask — here, 
anywhere — whether a price that is in fact no price — a price that does 
not register in legal terms — is too high a price? Can no price be too 
high a price? Whoever stands ready to accuse that we are already just 
playing here, should know that if this was a game, it would be a very 
treacherous one indeed.
The magistrate, the archive, memory and justice
To state, as I just did, that someone’s work is magisterial, immediately 
links it conceptually with the archival dimension of text and as such 
with the law. In his book, Archive Fever, Jacques Derrida argues that 
‘the meaning of “archive,” its only meaning, comes to it from the Greek 
arkheion: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the 
superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded.’5 It is thus 
always that which carries the magisterial quality that acquires the right 
both to speak (interpret) the law and to call upon or to command the 
law.6 This necessarily implies that the magistrate is, in fact, magister, 
that authority is referenced and located here. The etymology of course 
also indicates that the word ‘archive’ houses within itself two principles 
of order: topological and nomological, the principles of commence-
ment — there where things begin — and commandment — the law is 
called upon from this place where things begin.7
To say, therefore, that a work is magisterial is to claim that the work 
is expertly/authoritatively archival, and as such acquires the right to call 
upon (justify/interpret) the law with such authority. As we know all too 
well in South Africa — it is the archive that harbours, but does not by 
itself speak, the law. The authoritative interpretation is what speaks the 
law. Expertly archival — magisterial — Du Bois-Pedain’s text certainly 
is. Spanning over just under 400 pages, this work provides, as James L 
Gibson puts it in his review, ‘the closest, most detailed, and most com-
prehensive look at the amnesty component of South Africa’s truth and 
reconciliation process’8 As such, it carefully, painstakingly, documents 
(records, archives) — as its principal task — the often fraught history of 
the amnesty scheme which played such a decisive role in South Africa’s 
4 A Du Bois-Pedain Transitional Amnesty in South Africa (2008).
5 Derrida op cit (n1) 2.
6 Derrida op cit (n1) 1.
7 Ibid.
8 JL Gibson ‘Transitional amnesty in South Africa’ by Antje Du Bois-Pedain’ (2008) 18 
(7) Law and Politics Book Review available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/sub-
pages/reviews/dubois-pedain0708.htm, accessed 2 June 2009.
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transition from authoritarian rule to constitutional democracy. As such 
this archive is no doubt a work of memory and thus a work of justice.9
Following a brief but engaging introduction, the first two chapters 
provide the background to, overview of and practice in relation to the 
TRC-based amnesty scheme. Here the author vividly portrays the ‘build 
up’ to the amnesty provisions, situating them in the context of a history of 
various pieces of indemnity legislation passed in anticipation of the end of 
apartheid in South Africa. She exposes the contradictions and ironies that 
emerged during the judicial review of amnesty decisions and in chapter 
2 the author takes a close and fascinating look at the practice of the com-
mittee by subjecting the applications in relation to the TRC’s 1100 amnesty 
decisions to ‘particular factual criteria, which, in view of the definition of 
the political offense in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act 34 of 1995 (TRC Act), one might expect to have been relevant for the 
outcome of an amnesty application one way or another,’.10
Admitting to the fact that there are inherent limitations in the chosen 
methodology, the author defends the use of the participation-act as 
a basic statistical unit for the analysis — ‘one participation-act being 
one applicant’s personal contribution to an incident which forms the 
subject matter of an amnesty application’11 Du Bois Pedain proceeds 
to set out the findings in relation to the participation acts according 
to the information recorded in the study. I will not spoil the interested 
reader’s curiosity by providing a reductive summary of these findings. 
Suffice it to say that Du Bois-Pedain’s findings are well-presented and 
often striking. The reader will no doubt get a glimpse of these findings 
in the discussion that follows.
In chapters 3 and 4 the author’s empirical findings are put into the 
broader context of the work of the Amnesty Committee in order to 
explore what the findings in chapter 2 imply about the Committee’s 
understanding of the main substantive requirements for a successful 
amnesty application. I mentioned in the introduction that only particu-
lar kinds of horrific deeds qualified for amnesty and that the truth (but 
only a certain kind of truth) about these particular kinds of deeds was 
required for an application for amnesty to succeed. This is the case 
because the TRC Act provides that an applicant for amnesty only quali-
fied for such amnesty where the offence in respect of which amnesty 
is sought qualified as a ‘political offence’ (as defined) and where the 
9 J Derrida op cit (n1) 77: ‘Is it possible that the antonym of “forgetting” is not “remem-
bering”, but “justice?”’.
10 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 62.
11 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 66.
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applicant made a full disclosure of the details of and circumstances 
surrounding such offense.12
Regarding the former, Du Bois-Pedain argues that the findings of her 
study suggest that the Committee was markedly generous in applying 
the ‘political offence’ requirement — almost 90% of bona fide applicants 
(that is, applicants whose activities had ‘a political background in the 
broadest sense’) were granted amnesty.13 This generosity, argues Du 
Bois-Pedain, stemmed in part from the fact that the Committee followed 
a broad interpretation regarding the question whether an applicant 
had a sufficient political mandate in order to qualify for amnesty. In 
this regard, the author makes the point that, although proof of ordered 
deeds is a foolproof way of meeting the requirement of a political 
mandate, action on the basis of explicit orders was not a requirement 
for a successful amnesty application. The author also provides apt 
examples from the proceedings of the Amnesty Committee in order 
to illustrate this point and shows that this practice in relation to the 
significance of orders is also in line with international and local trends 
regarding orders in other legal contexts.
The practice of the Amnesty Committee did, however, diverge mark-
edly from international trends when it considered the overall approach 
to and interpretation of ‘the political’. The view of the political that is 
taken here proceeds from the point of view of the protagonists — the 
behaviour they viewed as politically driven.14 This does not mean that 
what is political is necessarily subjectively determined. As the author 
indicates, both the labels ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ accept the 
political aspect of the behaviour. The disagreement lies in the moral 
quality of the agent and his deed.15
Ultimately, this chapter explains that the Committee’s practice regard-
ing the political offence requirement did not judge the moral quality 
of the political deeds, rather its practice was fuelled by a pragmatic, 
factual understanding of the political (characteristic of Realpolitik16): 
12 Section 20(1) and (2) Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 
1995.
13 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 97.
14 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 132.
15 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 132-3.
16 B Frankel ‘Confronting neoliberal regimes: The Post-Marxist embrace of Populism and 
Realpolitik’ (1997) 226 New Left Review 57 argues that the return to Realpolitik in politi-
cal institutions marks the rise of neoliberalism in politics which is coupled with a denial 
of the old categories of Left and Right. The Committee’s practice is in this sense perhaps 
also an indication of the Zeitgeist that prevailed at the time. MH Arsanjani ‘The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and National Amnesty Laws’ (1999) 93 American Society of Inter-
national Law Proceedings 65-6, similarly, draws a link between controversial amnesty 
laws and ‘the present condition of Realpolitik’. Also see K Ambos ‘Prosecuting interna-
tional crimes at the National and international level: Between justice and Realpolitik’ in 
W Kaleck et al International Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes (2007) 55-68.
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‘The Committee is content to accept for the purposes of the law what 
it finds to have been the case in the world of facts: that, in the circum-
stances prevailing at the time and place where the perpetrator commit-
ted his act, his crime had a political connotation or was an expression 
of his political beliefs.’17 As the author argues, this interpretation of the 
political offence requirement was not an historical coincidence — it 
was, given the background and the stakes involved, a political neces-
sity. With this argument Du Bois-Pedain dispels the myth that when 
it came to the interpretation of the political offence requirement, a 
certain restrictive political moralism operated in the collective (un)
conscious of the Committee.
Chapter 4 builds on the link between the political offence require-
ment and the concept of full disclosure. Having argued in Chapter 3 that 
the recognition of a participation act as ‘political’ — from the vantage 
point of an empirical, factual interpretation of the term — greatly 
enhances the chances of full disclosure,18 Du Bois-Pedain continues 
to argue that it is the concept of full disclosure that forms ‘the moral 
cornerstone of the amnesty process’.19 Du Bois-Pedain admits that 
there is essentially a negotiation here, a negotiation, I would submit, in 
the sense of that word as Derrida uses it: ‘negotiation as a knot, as the 
work of the knot. In the knot of negotiation there are different rhythms, 
different forces’.20 This negotiation is, in addition, never a simple nego-
tiation as a calculation. It is a negotiation between the calculable and 
the incalculable, certainty and risk — negotiation between accepting 
a perpetrator’s submission that his deed was politically motivated (in 
accordance with the view the Committee took of the political) and 
running the risk that he or she may not have made a full disclosure.21 
This negotiation as a knot in the work of the committee exists between, 
on the one hand, the rife concessions to Realpolitik (or in favour of 
a realistic, pragmatic outcome) when it came to the interpretation of 
the political offence requirement, and, on the other, the full disclosure 
requirement which stood to countervail these concessions and provide 
the ethical defence of the amnesty scheme.
But what, then, constituted a ‘full disclosure’ in these circumstances? 
The answer to this question reveals that there is again much calcula-
tion (negotiation) involved between two extremes when it came to the 
interpretation of this aspect. Du Bois-Pedain points out that the TRC 
Act did not define full disclosure and that the Committee accordingly 
followed a middle way between an approach that would require the ap-
17 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 135.
18 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 136.
19 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 139.
20 J Derrida and E Rottenberg Negotiations: interventions and interviews (2002) 29.
21 Derrida op cit (n17) 31.
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plicant to disclose all facts of which he or she has knowledge, whether 
or not they relate directly or indirectly to the offence(s) for which the 
applicant applies for amnesty and an approach that would allow the 
applicant to essentially disclose only the strict facta probanda of the 
offence.22 This middle way (the negotiated way) takes as its starting 
point ‘the incident under consideration’ and requires that all ‘relevant 
facts’ of which the applicant has knowledge in relation to this incident 
be disclosed — applicants were not allowed to break up the incident 
into different parts and only disclose facta probanda of the offence(s) 
for which he is applying for amnesty.23
The link between Chapters 4 and 5 is the difference/divergence 
between full disclosure and truth. Having stressed the fact that the 
amnesty committee’s work represented a negotiation between the truth 
and the full disclosure requirement, Du Bois-Pedain indicates that 
this negotiation is in fact a negotiation between two non-negotiables. 
This involves another dimension of Derrida’s sense of negotiation: ‘[t]
here is negotiation when there are two incompatible imperatives that 
appear to be incompatible but are equally imperative. One does not 
negotiate between exchangeable and negotiable things. Rather, one 
negotiates by engaging the non-negotiable in negotiation.’24 Why are 
the ‘non-negotiables’ that are being negotiated with here clearly the 
concepts of full disclosure and truth? Because full disclosure was from 
the vantage point of the Amnesty Committee non-negotiable as a re-
quirement for amnesty, yet, as Du Bois-Pedain argues, the structural 
constraints in relation to the amnesty process — although requiring a 
full disclosure — necessarily limited the extent to which an incident 
under consideration could be further excavated for the discovery of 
‘the truth’ in relation to it. Yet from the point of view of the victims, 
knowing (as much as possible of) ‘the Truth’ was not negotiable. The 
structural ‘constraints’ could thus not merely be accepted uncritically 
and put forward as a reason why more truth could not be expected to 
emerge. Such a gesture held the potential to insult victims and alienate 
them from the process.
However, the Amnesty Committee, in the author’s words, ‘engages in 
factual investigations not for the sake of historical clarification, but in 
order to resolve factual uncertainties on which its decision on the ap-
plication hinges’.25 Factual investigations thus had a severely limited 
field of application. Only when factual uncertainties were present and 
the committee’s decision hinged on the resolution of these uncertain-
22 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 141-58.
23 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 151-2.
24 Derrida op cit (n17) 13.
25 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 179.
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ties, would it embark on such investigations. Other amnesty-related 
aspects that militated against truth recovery included the application 
of evidentiary privileges and the way in which the Committee dealt 
with implicated persons who were not victims. In this regard, Du Bois-
Pedain concludes that it was the Committee’s choice to make limited 
use of its investigative powers in this regard and not so much the 
applicable laws that limited truth discovery in this context.26 To my 
mind this represents a significant failure of the Amnesty Committee in 
the negotiation between truth for the victims and full disclosure by the 
applicant. In addition, if it is accepted that the moral justification of the 
conditional amnesty process was to be located in the full disclosure 
requirement, then this failure represents a significant failure in relation 
to such justification.
The author argues, nevertheless, (and I agree with her) that the truth 
recovery that could be achieved during the amnesty process is decid-
edly more substantial than what could be achieved in a criminal trial: 
‘[t]he amnesty scheme inspired many to participate who could never 
have been prosecuted successfully in a court of law.’27 In conclusion of 
the chapter, Du Bois-Pedain highlights the kind of truth that one could 
expect from the TRC process as a ‘dialogical’ or ‘shared truth’28 which is 
not necessarily an objective truth — indeed, sometimes, far from it.
Chapter 6 focuses specifically on the question whether one could 
expect from a conditional amnesty process (such as that of the TRC), 
an empowering effect on victims from past conflict. Pointing out that 
‘[t]he alleged victim-centredness of the truth and reconciliation process 
is the TRC’s dominant justificatory theme’, Du Bois-Pedain (with refer-
ence to the work of Stéphane Leman-Langlois) argues that when this 
is the centre of the endeavour, then the measure of its success is not 
retribution but victim’s participation and benefits resulting from such 
participation.29
The link between amnesty and benefits/empowerment to victims is, 
at best, a controversial one. Many victims in fact deny such a link and 
some victims who participated in the TRC process similarly argued 
that, if anything, the Amnesty Committee was ‘perpetrator friendly’.30 
The main reason for the perception that the amnesty process is per-
petrator orientated is because the absence of punishment is perceived 
as constituting what the author calls a ‘justice deficit’.31 In the light of 
this, ‘a full justification of the amnesty process … must be able to iden-
26 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 189.
27 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 208. 
28 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 216.
29 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 217.
30 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 218.
31 Ibid.
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tify some benefits of the amnesty process that criminal trials cannot 
provide, and show that these benefits are of such crucial importance 
for victims that they can (or at least ought to) override the victim’s 
desire for prosecution and punishment of the offender.’32
Following an incisive consideration of the meaning of the term 
‘victim’ as well as the rights a victim is accorded by the TRC Act, the 
chapter proceeds to put forward three case studies of actual victim-
perpetrator interaction — that between Jeffrey Benzien and his victims, 
Robert McBride and his victims and between Ginn Fourie and her 
daughter’s murderers. These case studies vividly illustrate the complex 
dynamics of victim-perpetrator interaction, and show that while these 
victims’ rights significantly expand the range of participatory options, 
their exercise does not necessarily ensure that victims will be satis-
fied with the process.33 The case study that deals with the amnesty 
application of Robert McBride portrays most vividly how perpetrator-
victim interaction can indeed be re-traumatising and disempowering, 
although this could be discerned also from aspects of the interaction 
between Benzien and Toni Yengeni.34 Du Bois-Pedain concludes that 
‘the amnesty process offers victims valuable opportunities for partici-
pation — but since it imposes a cost in the form of the absence of 
punishment’ it cannot be said that victims are more satisfied with the 
amnesty process than they are with the criminal trial.35
In chapter 7 the author identifies perpetrator accountability as one 
of the objectives that the TRC set out to achieve and analyses what 
this accountability meant and whether it was achieved. The notion of 
accountability obviously implies some conception of justice. Du Bois-
Pedain focuses on two forms of justice, retributive and restorative.36 
She argues that the amnesty process fits neither of these justice scripts 
completely. This requires a justification of the amnesty process in terms 
of ‘a new justice script for a transitional society in which a legacy 
of politically motivated violence needs to be addressed.’37 This new 
32 Ibid.
33 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 225.
34 Du Bois-Pedain curiously omits in her discussion of this interaction the moment 
when, after Benzien has illustrated the ‘wet bag’ method, he returns to his seat and 
re-addresses Mr Yengeni: ‘Do you remember Mr Yengeni that it took you thirty min-
utes before you betrayed Jennifer Schreiner? Do you remember pointing out Bongani 
Jonas to us on the highway?’ About this Antje Krog writes: ‘And so continues the tor-
ture of Tony Yengeni. Yengeni broke in under thirty minutes, suffocating in a plastic 
bag that denied him air and burnt his lungs, under the hands of Benzien. In the mind 
of Benzien, Yengeni, freedom fighter and anti-apartheid operative is a weakling, a 
man that breaks easily.’ A Krog Country of My Skull (1998) 73.
35 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 337.
36 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 257.
37 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 259.
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justice script morally condemns the resort to violence in political strife 
by labelling these acts of violence as ‘gross human rights violations’, 
while at the same time acknowledging perpetrators’ willingness to be 
part of the transitional process as something admirable.38
Archive Fever — once more
At this point Derrida’s Archive Fever interjects once more and for good 
reason. The part of Archive Fever that interjects here is its particular 
discussion of the Freudian understanding of thanatos or death-drive.39 
Freud argued that the human drive to survive is at the same time at war 
with the unconscious death drive — the drive to leave no trace, or the 
drive to self destruction.40 Derrida, following Freud argues that there is 
a death drive inherent in every archive as a hypomnesic device. Every 
archive harbours within it the force of its own destruction. In order to 
understand more fully what Derrida is saying here about the archive’s 
death drive it is necessary to quote him at length:
‘It is as if Freud could no longer resist, henceforth, the irreducible and origi-
nary perversity of this drive which he names here sometimes death drive, 
sometimes aggression drive, sometimes destruction drive, as if these three 
words were in this case synonyms. Second, this three-named drive is mute 
(stumm). It is at work, but since it always operates in silence, it never leaves 
any archives of its own. It destroys in advance its own archive, as if that were 
in truth the very motivation of its most proper movement. It works to destroy 
the archive: on the condition of effacing but also with a view to effacing its 
own “proper” traces — which consequently cannot properly be called proper. 
This drive, from then on, seems not only to be anarchic, anarchontic … the 
death drive is above all anarchivic, one could say, or archiviolithic.’41
To my mind, it is in chapter 7 of this work that we briefly get to see 
(veiled as it undoubtedly is) the death drive of this archive which is 
also the death drive of the TRC’s archive. But it is Du Bois-Pedain who 
frankly confronts the death drive in her/the archive and even ventures 
an explanation for its presence. Allow me to explain. In a work that 
attempts an overall justification of the conditional amnesty scheme and 
that I have already characterised as a work of memory and thus of 
justice, Du Bois-Pedain turns in this chapter to that which threatens 
to undermine her argument: the fact that offenders who are called to 
account for their deeds in political terms often fail to account for these 
deeds as moral wrongs: ‘Their explanations appear to deflect moral 
responsibility away from them, while falling short of any valid justifica-
38 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 296.
39 Derrida op cit (n1) 9-10.
40 S Freud, J Reddick Beyond the Pleasure Principle and other Writings (2003) 43.
41 Derrida op cit (n1) 10.
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tion or excuse. The normative requirement for a satisfactory account … 
is ignored in the amnesty context.’ 42
Here we clearly have what Žižek refers to in the quoted passage in 
the epigraph as ‘the limit of the “truth and reconciliation” idea’. What if 
the new justice script, for all its moral condemnations of the resort to 
violence during political strife, does not reach, impress or impact upon 
its intended addressees — the perpetrators — in the way Du Bois-
Pedain argues? Even worse, what if there were perpetrators for whom 
the public confession of their crimes not only did not give rise to any 
ethical catharsis, but even generated an additional obscene pleasure? 
Was this not the risk inherent in the Amnesty Committee’s decision to 
interpret the political offence requirement in an almost ‘anything goes’ 
fashion? Du Bois-Pedain admits to this possibility (indeed probability) 
in her dismissal of the justification of the amnesty scheme in terms of 
a restorative justice script, when she shows that conformity with such 
an ideal of justice is clearly undermined by, for instance, the fact that 
amnesty applicants do not have to show remorse or contrition and the 
fact that the Committee failed to insist that applicants account for their 
deeds in moral terms. To quote the author:
‘the process is doomed to fail as a ritual of “re-integrative shaming”. For 
while such a ritual should involve, at some point, the realisation on the part 
of the perpetrator that he stands exposed for a shameful act, the amnesty 
process may instead be experienced by individual applicants as a site of 
moral triumph: a forum where they can explain what they did, for all to see 
that their actions were indeed political, and hence not morally wrong.’43
As regards the role of apology and forgiveness, the author (to my mind 
correctly) dismisses ‘[a]ny attempt to defend the amnesty process on the 
basis of an alleged capacity to ensure that perpetrators apologise and 
victims forgive.’44 The inadequacy of justifying a conditional amnesty 
scheme on these terms is directly related to the fact that perpetrators 
were not forced to account for their actions as moral wrongs/viola-
tions. Du Bois-Pedain refers to the fact that the amnesty process did 
not require an apology and even when perpetrators apologised, the 
apology might in some cases have been insincere precisely because 
perpetrators do not regard their actions as morally wrong. This would 
be a further insult to victims. Moreover, as her account of Mrs Ginn 
Fourie’s engagement with the murderers of her daughters show, for-
giveness can take place without reconciliation and, in addition, well 
outside the institutional parameters of the TRC.45
42 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 258.
43 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 284.
44 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 287.
45 Du Bois-Pedain op cit (n2) 243-6.
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I do not agree with the central contentions of the authorities on 
forgiveness that Du Bois-Pedain cites in this section. This is the case 
because I believe that the contradictory logic in our heritage on forgive-
ness is not adequately addressed by these authors. As Derrida points 
out, the Abrahamic tradition leaves us with two opposing notions of 
forgiveness, one unconditional or ‘pure’ as Derrida calls it, the other 
conditional and impure, starting with the insistence on apology and re-
pentance.46 The insistence on apology, followed by forgiveness, Derrida 
contends, is not pure forgiveness.47 Apart from the fact that forgive-
ness is personal or intimate, it is also extraordinary and interruptive. 
Primarily because of the contradictory and unstable logic surrounding 
forgiveness it is improper/irresponsible to find a politics and a law on 
it (as so many role players in the TRC attempted to do).48
The flaws in the TRC’s amnesty practice, argues Du Bois-Pedain, 
should not be confused with the justice script that the TRC Act lent 
itself to. This justice script condemns the actions of perpetrators as 
morally wrong while acknowledging the perpetrator’s willingness to 
be involved in the amnesty scheme and to play according to its rules. 
I do not disagree that the TRC Act lent itself to such a justice script. 
The question remains though: how many perpetrators left the amnesty 
proceedings with the belief that their actions were morally unaccept-
able? How many perpetrators who refused to apply for amnesty or 
were not granted amnesty were smiling behind their hands and their 
handkerchiefs when the process was concluded — especially given 
the reluctance with which the post-amnesty phase of the TRC process 
is being addressed? Perhaps it is time to think seriously about the 
perpetrators and their role in the TRC process in the way suggested by 
Gillian Rose below:
‘they are necessary and unwanted guests at the performance … To mark their 
presence is to write as if the imaginary space of the master geographer was 
threatened from within and from without. It is to write as if the mirrors were 
not solid but permeable, as if the tain could move, as if the glass and silver 
were melting, as if there was an elsewhere. As if heroes were vampires … It 
46 J Derrida ‘On forgiveness’ in J Derrida, M Dooley & M Hughes (trans) On Cosmopoli-
tanism and Forgiveness 27-39.
47 Derrida op cit (n46) 32.
48 Derrida op cit (n46) 39.
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is to write as if the mirrors had bled, bled their violence, bled their ancestry, 
as if blood could be beautiful, as if an elsewhere was possible.’49
I am not suggesting here that a criminal trial process would have been 
less problematic in this respect, only that it should perhaps be admit-
ted that the amnesty process could only really be justified not in terms 
of justice but rather in terms of injustice, or in terms of a justice that 
is always more or less unjust.50 Perhaps it is necessary to continue 
acknowledging here the unjust sacrifices that were made for the birth 
of the new South Africa.
Conclusion
In the final pages of Archive Fever Derrida writes that ‘Nothing is less 
reliable, nothing is less clear today than the word ‘archive’. Nothing is 
more troubled and more troubling … the trouble of secrets, of plots, 
of clandestineness, of half-private, half-public conjurations, always at 
the unstable limit between public and private, between the family, the 
society, and the State, between the family and an intimacy even more 
private than the family, between oneself and oneself.’51 Nothing is more 
troubled and more troubling. Antje Du Bois-Pedain’s book illustrates 
many of the dimensions of the archival trouble regarding South Africa’s 
transition. In this respect it is a uniquely insightful work.
I believe however that, in order to truly begin to grasp the significance 
of this work, one would have to invoke the principle of consignation, 
which, in its real sense, does not just refer to the assigning of residence 
or to the act of entrusting so as to put into reserve,52 but also to ‘the 
act of con-signing through gathering together signs.’53 This gathering 
together of signs foregrounds the commanding (nomological) aspect of 
the archive, because it directly involves what Derrida calls the question 
of the archive: ‘But where does the outside commence? This question 
49 G Rose ‘As if the mirrors had bled: Masculine dwelling, masculinist theory and femi-
nist masquerade’ in N Duncan (ed) BodySpace (1996) 56, 72. The author relies implic-
itly on the Lacanian theory of the mirror phase — the point of psychical formation 
when an infant recognises herself in the mirror. The phase which follows is the entry 
into the symbolic form of language. Those who do not successfully overcome the mir-
ror phase often become self-obsessed narcissists (literally always only re-cognising 
themselves). Du Bois-Pedain’s text reveals, to my mind, precisely how many accounts 
were given motivated purely by narcissistic self-aggrandisement. See in this regard 
particularly the account of the amnesty application of Robert McBride in Du Bois-
Pedain op cit (n2) 232-42.
50 See JWG Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice (2005) 15.
51 Derrida op cit (n1) 90.
52 Derrida op cit (n1) 3.
53 Derrida op cit (n1) 3.
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is the question of the archive. There are undoubtedly no others.’54 The 
principle of consignation thus turns us to the question of the archive 
as the question of the unstable limit between an inside and an outside 
of the archive — an outside without which there can be no archive. Du 
Bois-Pedain’s archive has its own outside. I would go so far as to say 
that she is acutely aware of this troubling fact and cannot resist not to 
expose her archive to its outside. This is, no doubt, also a gathering 
together of signs. And this is also why her work is a work that seriously 
reckons with the death drive and thus succeeds in countering it.
The archive is always both revolutionary and traditional, institutive 
and conservative: ‘it keeps, it puts in reserve, it saves, but in an unnatural 
fashion, that is to say in making the law (nomos) or in making people 
respect the law.’55 Transitional Amnesty in South Africa — as a work of 
the gathering together of signs — offers the most detailed, self-critical 
and frank justification for South Africa’s conditional amnesty scheme 
available in the literature. In this sense, it makes us (understand and) 
respect the law without falling into a complacent legal argument that 
is insensitive to the sensitivities that prevail on all sides of the debate. 
It is without a doubt still sensitive to the concept of a justice that is 
always already still to come — á venir — but still a justice that requires 
decision and therefore the law.56 This is its legacy and its ultimate 
achievement.
54 Derrida op cit (n1) 8.
55 Derrida op cit (n1) 7.
56 J Derrida ‘Force of law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ (1990) 11 Cardozo 
Law Review 921.
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